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Introduction
A central principle of antitrust policy is that firms must not communicate with each other. If firms in an industry talk about prices, they engage in cartel activities that are illegal in most jurisdictions. Evidence that firms explicitly talked to each other is often the smoking gun in antitrust procedures, as it usually presents a per se violation of competition law. Without communication firms may still coordinate on prices, but such tacit agreements are treated in an entirely different way from a legal perspective. Thus, whether or not firms communicate is absolutely central to antitrust policy.
The significance of explicit communication in policy is in stark contrast to its relative lack of importance in economic theory. Since talk between firms is illegal and cannot be enforced, the incentives to adhere to collusive agreements are the same with and without communication. This implies that the set of equilibria in repeated oligopoly is often the same regardless of whether firms talk 1 -which seems at odds with the fundamental distinction in policy. As Harrington (2008, p. 6) puts it, "there is a gap between antitrust practice which distinguishes [between] explicit and tacit collusion and economic theory which (generally) does not."
One impact of explicit communication that has been acknowledged by economic theory is that it may help firms to coordinate (see Crawford and Sobel, 1982; and Farrell and Rabin, 1996 , for a review). In repeated games, there are many collusive equilibria and therefore firms face a coordination problem. Cheap talk seems useful as it can enable firms to coordinate on a certain equilibrium. Whereas the positive impact of such cheap talk in pure coordination games (like the battle of the sexes) is undisputed, its effect on dilemma games like oligopoly is subject to debate among theorists (see Farrell and Rabin, 1996; Whinston, 2008) .
Even if we accept the notion that communication may facilitate coordination in repeated oligopoly, details and rigorous analysis remain elusive. Whinston (2008, p. 21) re-to communicate to each other. In Talk, subjects were allowed to communicate with one another for one minute in every period of the experiment via typed messages, using an instant-messenger communication tool. The limit of one minute was sufficiently long for the communication phase as most talk ended (also in the larger oligopoly markets) before the one-minute period was over. Subjects were free to post as many messages they liked, but they were not allowed to identify themselves or to post offensive messages. Subjects were aware that they communicated to their entire group and nobody outside the group. This form of communication is one of the least restrictive forms available and is one of the most effective in terms of facilitating cooperation (Crawford, 1998; Brosig et al., 2003 .) While potentially being a noisier form of communication, it may also be natural to participants.
It seems appropriate for cartel negotiations (as opposed to one-sided pre-formulated announcements). Free chat may also reduce the potential for experimenter demand effects -restricting messages to be of a particular nature may signal to participants the research objective of the experiment, which could bias their behavior. Furthermore, Crawford (1998) indicates that communication in experiments works as a means by which participants can reassure each other and reduce uncertainty about their decisions. Such reassurance will be most effective when expressed in free-form language (Brosig et al., 2003) .
We compare the Talk and NoTalk conditions within subjects. Each experimental session was divided in two parts. Similar to Brandts and Cooper (2007) , communication was impossible in the first part of most treatments (NoTalk) whereas talking was allowed in the second part of the experiment (Talk). Subjects only read the instructions for the second part of the experiment after the first part had ended. Also, at no point prior to the beginning of part two was it mentioned that there would be the possibility for communication. In order to control for order effects, we ran an additional treatment with n = 4 firms where communication was allowed in the first part of the experiment but not in the second part (here, the order is Talk-NoTalk). Furthermore, in order to control for the effect of experience,
we ran a control treatment where firms were not able to communicate in either part of the experiment (NoTalk-NoTalk). Subjects were matched with the same participants in both Talk and NoTalk conditions. Table 1 summarizes our treatments.
Phase 1 Phase 2 n = 2 n = 4 n = 6 n = 8
NoTalk Talk
Talk NoTalk NoTalk NoTalk We generated six markets (or groups) for each treatment. We conducted all duopolies in one session. We had two sessions for the four-firm and six-firm markets, and we had three sessions for the eight-firm markets. The sessions were run in the FEELE lab at the University of Exeter and were programed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) .
We provided written experimental instructions (which were read out loud) which informed subjects of all the features of the market. Sample instructions are available in the Appendix. Specifically, subjects were told they were representing a firm in a market with other firms. In each period, after communicating in the Talk parts, subjects had to enter their price at a computer terminal. Once all subjects had made their decisions, the period ended and a screen displayed the prices chosen by all firms in the market and the profit of each individual firm in that particular period. The screen also displayed the accumulated 2 The continuation probability of 5/6 ensures that the conventional wisdom is actually predicted in the repeated game for both communication conditions if the continuation probability is interpreted as the discount factor. For probabilities smaller than 0.5, none of our oligopolies have collusive equilibria, while the opposite is true for probabilities of at least 0.875 (see below); in this case all oligopolies have a collusive equilibrium. Dal Bó (2005) presents evidence that the continuation probability may have an impact in repeated prisoner's dilemma experiments.
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profits of the individual participant up to that point but not those of other participants.
Payments consisted of a show-up fee of £5 plus the sum of the profits over the course of the experiment. For payments, we used an "Experimental Currency Unit (ECU)"; 50,000 ECU were worth £1 in the duopolies and accordingly with higher n such that maximum possible earnings were equalized across treatments. Sessions lasted for about 60 minutes and the average payment was £13.71 (roughly $22).
In total, 168 students participated in our experiments. Subjects participated in one experiment only and had not participated in similar oligopoly experiments before.
Hypotheses
We begin with the impact of the number of the firms. Starting with Chamberlin (1929) , there is a firm belief in the industrial organization literature that the fewness of firms facilitates collusion. This conventional wisdom appears on the common lists of factors facilitating collusion (Scherer, 1980; Tirole, 1989; Ivaldi et al., 2003; Levenstein and Suslow, 2006 ).
That collusion is easier with fewer firms is intuitive and can be easily formalized. In our setup, the collusive profit an individual firm makes is pm/n when all firms charge the same price p-which is decreasing in n. By defecting from the collusive agreement, a firm can make a profit of no more than pm, regardless of the number of firms. The static Nash equilibrium has all firms obtaining zero profit, again independently of the n. 3 Thus, in an infinitely repeated game with Nash-reversion trigger strategies and where firms discount future profits by a factor δ, we need pm/(n(1−δ)) ≥ pm for collusion to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium,
As the number of firms in the market increases, the minimum discount factor required for collusion to be successful also rises.
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Note that the formalization of the conventional wisdom as summarized in (1) 7 One may counter-argue that communication enables renegotiations which make punishments that are necessary to sustain collusion non-credible (Bernheim and Ray, 1989; Farrell and Maskin, 1989) . Such weakening of punishment possibilities should work against the positive effect communication is hypothesized to have on cooperation. However, a negative impact of renegotiation possibilities does not clearly come out in experiments. Cooper and Kühn (2012) find that price agreements are even more likely when they allow for renegotiation. Camera et al. 
Main treatment effects
We report our results in two parts. Section 4 will focus on the (quantitative) effects our treatments have on selling prices, whereas Section 5 is about how firms collude (qualitatively) in terms of their pricing strategies and the communication content.
A few remarks on how we handled the data and on the statistical tests applied are warranted. In most parts of the analysis, the data we report are selling prices. Selling prices, or the winning bids, are equivalent to industry profits in our setup. Unless otherwise indicated, we employ non-parametric tests where we conservatively count each of the six groups (markets) we have for each treatment as one single observation and take the average selling price across all periods in a given market. We exclude the data from periods 1 to 5 from the analysis because we find a time trend that is particularly pronounced in the early NoTalk periods (see below). None of our results change qualitatively if we include the first five periods though. Finally, we analyze the treatment with the reversed order (TalkNoTalk, which has n = 4 firms) and the control treatment NoTalk-NoTalk (also n = 4) separately from the other treatments because of significant differences we observe. That is, in this subsection and the next the next subsections, we only consider treatments where the sequence was NoTalk-Talk.
The number of firms and the impact of communication
First, we test whether the conventional wisdom holds in our experiment and we begin with NoTalk (Hypothesis 1). Figure 1 shows the average selling prices across all treatments.
We see that average selling prices monotonically decline as the number of firms increases in NoTalk. The correlation of average selling prices and n is significant (Spearman's ρ = −0.9318, p < 0.001, based on 24 group averages). We find that, despite the only minuscule differences between the n ≥ 4 markets, all treatments differ also in pairwise comparisons (two-sided Mann-Whitney U tests, all p-values < 0.05).
Quite obviously, only the duopolies are able to maintain somewhat collusive prices.
This confirms the findings in the literature (see footnote 5) that "two are few and four are many" (Huck, Normann and Oechssler, 2004) , meaning that markets are unlikely to be (tacitly) collusive when there are more than three firms.
9 Put differently, one could interpret the prices above one as very low collusive prices but probably a more sensible interpretation is that prices reflect the non-collusive solution for n > 2. With communication (Talk), we also see a significant decline in average selling prices when the number of firms increases (Spearman's ρ = −0.5076, p = 0.011). Hence we find support for Hypothesis 3. The effect of the number of firms on prices appears to be linear and qualitatively different than the relationship between number of firms and prices when communication is absent. This finding is new to the experimental literature. There is also some heterogeneity across groups, reflected in the fact that treatments do not differ in pairwise comparisons, except for n = 2 vs. n = 8 (two-sided Mann-Whitney rank-sum, p = 0.036). For all n, we see a sharp rise in selling prices under the Talk condition (dark bars) compared to NoTalk (light bars). Indeed, all 24 individual markets have higher prices in the Talk phase. These differences are highly significant (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value < 0.001), rejecting the null hypothesis that communication has no effect and supporting our Hypothesis 3.
11 A conspicuous finding in Figure 1 is that eight firms with communication results in a level of competition commensurate with the duopolies without communication -which of course is consistent with Results 1 to 3.
Result 3: Prices are higher with communication.
The gain from communication
We now turn to our Explorative Research Question 4, the relationship between the gain from communicating and the number of firms. Figure 1 shows that the gain from communicating is not monotonic. Selling prices increase by 43.2 for n = 2, by 75.3 for n = 4, by 62.5 for n = 6 and by 54.1 for n = 8. That is, the highest gain from communication is realized in the four-firm oligopolies whereas duopolies and eight-firm markets have the lowest incentive to communicate. In other words, we observe an inversely U-shaped relationship between the gain from communication and n. Statistical support for this result is that the four-firm oligopolies have a higher gain from talking than the duopolies (two-sided Mann-Whitney U test, p-value = 0.055) whereas the six-and eight-firm markets do not (p-value = 0.337 and p-value = 0.631).
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We can exploit the heterogeneity of the data at the market level to illustrate which share of industries would choose to talk, had this choice been available in our experiment rather than exogenously imposed, and were the choice to talk associated with a fine. If an industry chooses not to talk, it may be tacitly collusive (if the price is above marginal cost) or it may be competitive (if not). For simplicity assume that firms are risk-neutral and face an expected cartel fine of 50: one would obtain the pattern in Figure 2 , which plots the relative frequency of firms whose gain from talking outweighs the fine (dark blue = explicit cartel); whose gain from talking is not sufficient to cover the expected fine, but can coordinate implicitly (light blue = tacit collusion); whose gain from talking is not larger than the expected fine, and whose price is close to Bertrand-Nash (grey = competition).
We observe the inverse U-shaped pattern again and that the n = 4 oligopolies exhibited 12 Our perspective is that firms generally do not talk but that they may choose to do so if the gain from communication is sufficiently high. However, Martin Dufwenberg pointed out to us that it could well be the other way round; that the opportunity to talk is always there in the field and that the experimental NoTalk condition is better thought of as a fictitious antitrust authority's ideal state. From this perspective, our results can be reinterpreted in that we show that the antitrust authorities' preoccupation with communication is warranted.
the highest frequency of explicit cartels. The duopolies are collusive (either with or without talk), and the share of competitive industries increases in n. Remarkably, Harrington (2010, p. 39-40) conjectures that this very picture will emerge in the field. This is merely an illustrative example. The picture looks qualitatively the same for other levels of the cartel fine, unless fines are prohibitively high (in which case no industry would choose to talk) or sub-deterrent (so that they all choose to talk). Figure 2: The share of industries for which talking pays ("Explicit cartel") given a hypothetical expected cartel fine of 50. If the gain from talking is less than 50, the industry will either be tacitly collusive (price above marginal cost) or competitive.
Result 4:
The gain from talking is inversely U-shaped with the number of firms.
We wish to emphasize that our results should be not interpreted quantitatively but qualitatively. In this context, Holt (1995) was already skeptical that there would be a "magic" number of firms beyond which markets would be competitive because structural factors other than the number of firms (e.g., the underlying oligopoly model) would also have an impact, in and outside the lab. The same point concerns our finding that industries with four firms have the highest likelihood of being explicitly collusive. Both in the field and in different experiments, the incentives to collude explicitly may turn out to be different, especially since the average selling prices for n ≥ 4 are already quite close to zero and statistically not different from each other. Qualitatively, though, we expect our findings to be a useful basis for further research.
Comparing our results to the cartel literature, it is (at least at first sight) irritating that the empirical evidence regarding the conventional wisdom in the field is mixed. Already, Posner (1970, p. 410) found that a "large proportion" of the cartels he studied were "in industries not normally regarded as highly concentrated." Hay and Kelly (1974, p. 21) observe that "in many cases larger groups conspire." And Levenstein and Suslow (2006, p.
58) conclude that "there is no simple relationship between industry concentration and the likelihood of collusion" in their influential recent meta study on cartels.
Why is there no clear-cut evidence? The empirical cartel literature only observes those industries that decided to form a cartel and were subsequently detected. Thus, even if the conventional wisdom were true, it may not be observable in cartel field data since there is a sample-selection bias. In the field, only those industries that do not find the opportunity to collude tacitly attractive will cartelize. Note at this stage a key advantage of the experiment:
by imposing the communication condition exogenously, we can avoid the sample-selection problem of cartel field data. In other words, while our data confirm that "collusion is easier with fewer firms" both with and without communication, they also show that this finding may not imply that there are more explicitly colluding cartels with fewer firms in the field where the decision to talk is endogenous. Thus, the conventional wisdom may not be a useful guiding principle for structural cartel detection in the field. 13 Our results suggest that looking for non-linear effects could be promising.
The long-run effects of communication
In this section, we will focus on the variant in which we reversed the order of the treatments.
For n = 4 firms, we ran six markets where subjects had the opportunity to talk in the first phase but they did not have the same opportunity in the second phase. So, the sequence was Talk-NoTalk in this variant. The data of the NoTalk-NoTalk treatment confirm that the hysteresis result is not simply a learning effect. In the NoTalk-NoTalk control treatment, subjects were unable to communicate in either phase, but they could have learned from their experience in the first phase-just as in Talk The hysteresis effect has an implication for policy. Fines and private damages may be calculated by taking the difference between the price when the cartel was active and the postdetection price. If hysteresis effects are present, fines and damages would be underestimated.
The evolution of prices
Concluding this section, Figure 3 5 Collusive pricing strategies
The distribution of selling prices
In this section, we will take a look at the pricing strategies firms employ over time. Upfront, we report the distribution of selling prices, denoted henceforth by p := min{p 1 , ..., p n }. Table   2 shows the relative frequency of selling prices from period six onwards. For NoTalk, Table   2 shows that there are virtually no observations with p ≥ 99, which seems-at least for the 
Pricing strategies as Markov processes
We analyze the pricing dynamics in Talk as first-order Markov processes. We consider three states: (i) p = 100, (ii) p = 99, and (iii) p < 99, and we use the data from all periods.
State (i) is modal for n = 2, 4 and state (iii) is modal for n = 6, 8. State (iii) is rather broad, but including an additional state does not yield further insights or results that differ qualitatively (the analysis with p ∈ [50, 98] as an additional state is available from the authors upon request). Table 3 : Transition matrices (Talk treatments).
A key observation in Table 3 is that all three states are rather stable. The likelihood to stay in state (i) depends on n and varies between 78 and 95 percent. The probabilities to stay in state (ii) range between 70 and 87 percent, and the third state is the most stable one for the n = 6 and n = 8 treatments (with 81 to 95 percent stability). Confirming this point,
we compute an index of mobility (Shorrocks, 1978 ; see also Riener, 2011, for a discussion)
for this transition matrix, given by φ = (k − tr(M ))/(k − 1), where k is the number of states and tr(M ) is the trace of the transition matrix M . We find φ = 0.20 for n = 2, φ = 0.24 for both n = 4 and n = 6, and φ = 0.28 for n = 8. The Shorrocks index of stability increases in the number of firms, which implies a greater mobility of transitions from state to state for higher n. But the general level of the index suggests low mobility.
The counterpart to behavior being stable within states is, of course, that firms rarely move between states. Specifically, firms find it difficult to (re-)establish successful collusion (state (i)) when being in states (ii) and (iii). Even with communication, firms do not often manage to get back to successful collusion with all firms charging 100 once the price has dropped.
Pricing strategies in chat discussions
We will now illustrate the findings in Tables 2 and 3 Collusion where firms take turns in being the low-price firm. Explicit agreements where (typically) one firm becomes the low-price firm (p = 99) whereas all other firms charge p = 100 are a second popular collusive strategy. Taking turns is slightly less efficient than all firms charging 100 and this inefficiency is often mentioned in the markets whose firms take turns. 16 We have five markets which take turns repeatedly: one duopoly (over 20 periods), two six-firm markets (over 12 and 18 periods), and one eight-firm market (14 periods).
Interestingly, we do not observe a single instance of deviation when firms take turns (see below our general discussion of deviations), so this strategy is rather successful. 17 We find that these five markets explain roughly half of the p = 99 observations (64 of 120).
Here is an exemplary discussion (n = 2, market 2, period one) for the taking-turns strategy:
... Firm A: surely, we should take it in turns putting 99 and 100? Firm B: so choose 100 each time? Firm A: that would make more profit? 16 One can show that the minimum discount factor required for such a taking-turns strategy to be subgameperfect Nash equilibrium in the infinitely repeated game is implicitly defined by 1 − δ n − δ n−1 = 0. That is, the minimum discount factor varies between 0.62 (for n = 2) and 0.91 (n = 8) which is slightly above the threshold of (n − 1)/n required for common-price collusion (see (1) ). Also, note that the taking-turns strategy would be even less efficient if the action space was coarser. 17 As an aside, we note that the n = 4 Talk data stand out in various dimensions. They are more likely to be in state (i), more likely to stay in state (i), and their agreements also have a longer duration than the duopolies. However, selling prices (profits) are higher with n = 2 than with n = 4. There are two explanations for this. First, there is no n = 4 market where firms take turns but there is one duopoly. As taking turns occurs in state (ii), the focus on state (i) in this comparison underestimates the performance of the duopolies. Second, selling prices with n = 4 are rather low whenever p < 100. So pricing in the n = 4 Talk markets is rather polarized, and they are rather unforgiving after collusion collapses.
Firm B: oh okay, alright you go first, choose 99 Firm A: ok Firm B: and then I will afterwards, deal? Firm A: when i put 99 you put 100, deal Defections. As can be seen in Table 3 It is useful to take a look at Markov chains of length 2, where a market moves from state (i) to state (ii). We observe 21 cases where all firms charge a price of 100 in t − 2 and at least one firm charges 99 in t − 1. In ten of these cases, firms manage to maintain p ≥ 99 in period t, as in the above example. 18 Thus even in what appears to be textbook cases of defection from common-price collusion, firms only trigger punishments in about half of the cases. Note that these "punishments" are rather broadly defined as p < 99 occurring at least once, which is rather different from permanently triggering p ≤ 1. This reluctance to start punishment phases seems reasonable since n ≥ 4 firms find it difficult to move back to higher states (see Table 3 ). 19 Here is another example, with n > 2 firms. Without saying much, players quickly suggest resuming the collusive strategy, and they do manage to re-establish 18 A look at the chat data reveals that two cases were deliberate moves from common-price collusion to a strategy of taking turns; thus there are only 19 deviations, and in eight cases a decline to p < 99 was prevented. Oligopolies with n = 4 are least likely to stay in p ≥ 99 (1 of 5 cases) after a defection whereas n = 8 oligopolies are most likely to do so (5 of 7 cases).
19 Consistent with these results, Genesove and Mullin (2001) find that cheating did occur frequently but only rarely triggered punishments in the extensively communicating sugar cartel (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) Table 2 suggests that such price wars do occur regularly in Talk with n ≥ 6 firms. Here is an example that documents the complex interaction of threats, punishments and prices wars over several periods.
Market 4 of the eight-firm oligopolies successfully established a common price of 100 in periods 1 to 12. In period 13, Firm A deviates with a price of 99. In the following chat, Firm G threatens to trigger a price war ("if you do it again -its heading for 1's"), Firm A apologizes, and the firms agree to resume collusion rather than triggering the punishment.
In period 14, Firm A sets 99 and Firm B charges 98. Several players suggest returning to colluding at a common price of 100. Firm G threatens directly again ("this is your last chance before i start hitting 0") and so does Firm F (''if this happens again, we'll all undercut and you'll be the losers"). We find that the medium-sized industries benefit the most from talking as they are rather competitive without communication, but are still able to maintain some collusion by talking. In contrast, the duopolies have little to gain from talking as they already earn decent profits without talking, and the large oligopolies gain less because they find it difficult to collude successfully even with communication. This result sheds an interesting light on the conventional wisdom that increasing the number of firms in a market reduces their ability to collude on supra-competitive prices (Chamberlin, 1929; Scherer, 1980; Tirole, 1989; Ivaldi et al., 2003) . We find that the conventional wisdom holds regardless of whether firms can communicate, but the gain from communicating is non-monotonic. This may explain the puzzle in the empirical cartel literature that the conventional wisdom often does not materialize (Posner, 1970; Levenstein and Suslow, 2006) : when firms can endogenously choose between tacit and explicit collusion (as is the case in the field), they may face incentives that are not monotonic in the number of firms.
Our experimental data also illustrate how communication supports collusion. There are three main channels. Communication helps firms coordinating on a price or more sophisticated pricing patterns (like taking turns in placing the low bid). This is in stark contrast to the treatments without communication where firms virtually never coordinated successfully, not even the duopolies. It appears that talking removes the strategic uncertainty present otherwise and only with communication do firms manage to coordinate on a price, sometimes even among a large numbers of firms. Communication is, secondly, frequently used for dispute mediation in our experiments. Defections occur, but they do frequently not lead to price wars. In fact, conflict mediation to avoid the decline of prices appears to be among the and not how the number of firms affects the decision to set up a cartel (all studies employ three-firm markets). We leave this issue for future research.
Instructions -Part 1
Hello and welcome to our experiment. Please read this instruction set very carefully, since through your decisions and the decisions of other participants, you may stand to gain a significant amount of money. We ask you to remain silent during the entire experiment; if at any point in time you require assistance, please raise your hand.
In the first part of this experiment you will be in the role of a firm, which is in a market with another firm. The firms produce some good and there are no costs of producing this good.
This market is made up of 300 identical consumers, each of whom wants to purchase one unit of the good at the lowest price. The consumers will pay as much as 100 Experimental Currency Units (ECU) for a unit of the good.
In each market there will be two firms, A and B. You can find your type written on the top right-hand corner of this instruction set. Each firm will be able to supply 300 consumers.
The market will operate as follows. In the beginning of each period, all firms will set their selling prices. Then the firm who set the lowest price will sell its capacity at the selected price. The other firm will not have any customers left to supply.
If more than one firm set the lowest price, then they will split the available consumers. In order to fix ideas, let us go over a couple of illustrative examples:
Example 1: Suppose that the two firms choose the following prices: Firm A sets a price of 85 and firm B chooses a price of 75. Firm B set the lowest price and therefore sells its 300 units first at a price of 75, making a profit of 22,500 ECU. Firm A therefore will not supply any customers, therefore making 0 ECU.
Example 2: Suppose that the two firms choose the following prices: Firm A and firm B both set a price of 70. Given that firms A and B set the same price, they will have to share the available customers equally. Hence, both firms will sell 150 units at a price of 70 each unit, therefore making a profit of 10,500 ECU.
At the end of each period, all the firms are informed of the chosen prices by all firms and their own profits.
There will be at least 20 periods in this part of the experiment; once the 20th period is over, the computer will throw a virtual dice that will determine whether the experiment continues. If a value of six is shown, the experiment is over. If any other value is shown, the experiment continues.
You will be matched with the same participants in every period. At the end of the experiment, you will be told of the sum of profits made during the experiment, which will be your payment. You will receive £1 for every 50,000 ECU you earn during the experiment. You will also receive £5 for participating.
Instructions -Part 2 (only shown to subjects after Part 1 was complete) In this part of the experiment, you will be required to make the same decisions as in Part 1. The difference to Part 1 is that now you will be able to communicate with the other person you are matched with. To this effect, we will provide you with a chat box, which you can use to send messages to the other person. Only the person with whom you are matched will be able to see the messages you post.
In each period, you will be allowed to send messages to the other firm in your market for 1 minute. You are allowed to post how many messages you like. There are only two restrictions on messages: you may not post messages which identify yourself (e.g. age, gender, location etc.) and you may not use offensive language.
After the minute expires, the chat box will close and you will have to choose your price. Like in Part 1, at the end of each period, all the firms are informed of the chosen prices by all firms and their own profits.
There will be at least 20 periods in this part of the experiment; once the 20th period is over, the computer will throw a "virtual" dice that will determine whether the experiment continues. If a value of six is shown, the experiment is over. If any other value is shown, the experiment continues.
You will be matched with the same participants you were matched with in Part 1, and they will remain matched with you for the whole of Part 2.
At the end of the experiment, you will be told of the sum of profits made during the experiment, which will be your payment. You will receive £1 for every 50,000 ECU you earn during the experiment. 
